Everyday and academic thinking : implications for learning and problem solving by Reeve, Robert A. et al.
H
ILLI NOI S
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
PRODUCTION NOTE
University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign Library
Large-scale Digitization Project, 2007.

Technical Report No. 349
EVERYDAY AND ACADEMIC THINKING:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEARNING AND PROBLEM SOLVING
Robert A. Reeve
Annemarie S. Palincsar
and Ann L. Brown
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
December 1985
Center for the Study of Reading
TECHNICAL
REPORTS
UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA-CHAMPAIGN
51 Gerty Drive
Champaign, Illinois 61820
BOLT BERANEK AND NEWMAN INC.
50 Moulton Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238
The Nation
Institute
Educati
U.S. Departmen
Educa
Washington. D.C. 20

CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF READING
Technical Report No. 349
EVERYDAY AND ACADEMIC THINKING:
IMPLICATIONS FOR LEARNING AND PROBLEM SOLVING
Robert A. Reeve
Annemarie S. Palincsar
and Ann L. Brown
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
December 1985
University of Illinois
at Urbana-Champaign
51 Gerty Drive
Champaign, Illinois 61820
Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc.
10 Moulton Street
Cambridge, Massachusetts 02238
The preparation of this paper was completed with support from the National
Institute of Child Health and Human Development (Grants HD05951, HD06864),
Department of Education (Grant 00840068), and from the National Institute
of Education (Contract No. 400-81-0030). We would like to thank Joseph
Campione whose ideas influenced many aspects of this paper. Portions of
the paper were given by Ann L. Brown at the annual meeting of the American
Education Research Association, New Orleans, April, 1984.
Everyday and Academic Thinking
2
Abstract
It is suggested that some of the difficulties students experience
in solving academic problems are due to their failure to
distinguish between those skills needed for everyday thinking and
those needed for academic thinking. It is argued that certain
characteristics of everyday thinking are ill-matched to the needs
of formal education, and that the failure to identify contexts in
which intentional cognition is required may prevent successful
problem solving. As evidence for this view, research is
discussed which shows that the comprehension failures of poor
readers are often associated with their inadequate comprehension
monitoring skills; but, it is also shown that effective
monitoring skills can be taught. The possibility of extending
these intervention procedures to foster problem solving in
science and math are discussed.
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Everyday and Academic Thinking:
Implications for Learning and Problem Solving
In this paper we explore the view that the difficulties some
students experience in learning from texts, and in solving other
types of academic problems, are due to their failure to
distinguish between those skills needed for everyday thinking and
those skills needed for academic thinking. Functionally, the
distinction between everyday and academic thinking skills is
somewhat akin to a difference between effortless or incidental
cognition and deliberate effortful cognition. In general,
everyday thinking skills provide the means for interacting with
our world on a day-to-day basis, involve routine scripted
activities, and are executed relatively automatically. Problems
requiring academic thinking skills, in contrast, place a far
greater emphasis on precision, deliberate evaluation, accurate
understanding, and predictions consistent with the provided
facts.
For the purposes of this paper we treat the distinction
between everyday and academic thinking skills as a heuristic
distinction, rather than one which emphasizes a continuity of
skills, or one which implies the existence of two qualitatively
different skill categories. However, we believe that the
overreliance on everyday thinking skills in academic domains will
cause students difficulty in solving intellectual problems.
Everyday and Academic Thinking
As a means of advancing our view we examine the effective
learning strategies that are supposedly in the repertoire of
expert readers but which must be acquired by novices if they are
to become experts. First, we discuss the types of processing
problems children experience when asked to read in order to meet
a strict criteria of understanding or remembering. Second, we
suggest that the reason some students have pervasive problems
with academic learning is because their thinking has all the
strengths and biases of everyday thinking. Third, we then argue
that certain characteristics of everyday thinking are
particularly ill-matched with the demands of formal science
education. Forth, we discuss, briefly, possible interventions
that have worked in introducing more effective learning and
teaching strategies in the general realm of reading
comprehension. We also speculate on possible extensions of that
work to the teaching of math and science, at least at the level
of basic number principles.
Cognitive Monitoring and Comprehension
Many reading activities, at least by the latter part of
grade school, actually call for a variety of thinking and study
skills (Brown & Palincsar, in press); students are not only
required to decode, they are also required to understand the
meaning, to evaluate the message, and even use what they read to
solve problems. In order to do this, they must engage in a
variety of activities that will foster comprehension and
retention. Trouble will ensue if students choose to remain
passive in the hope that learning will occur automatically. In
order to learn effectively they must engage in intentional
cognition rather than rely exclusively on incidental learning
(Brown, 1975; Berieter & Scardmalia, 1985).
It has been argued that effective learning from texts
involves a split mental focus (Brown, 1980): students must focus
on the material to be learned, and, at the same time, monitor
their understanding and retention of it. In addition, they must
check to see if they are employing those mental operations that
will produce learning.
Students who know how to study efficiently proceed very
differently when they are reading for pleasure or to obtain a
quick impression of the gist, compared with when they are reading
in order to remember the text, or compared with when they are
attempting to resolve comprehension difficulties (Brown, 1980;
Brown, Armbruster, & Baker, in press; Forrest-Pressley & Waller,
1984). In the first state (incidental learning), they read
rapidly and, seemingly, effortlessly; but in the latter state
(intentional and effortful learning), they proceed slowly and
laboriously, calling into play a whole variety of learning
strategies and comprehension-fostering activities.
The deliberate use of understanding processes requires the
judicious allocation of effort which does not come naturally to.
all learners. For example, one seventh grade student, asked how
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he reads when he wants to make sure he will understand and
remember, responded, "... well ... I stare real hard at the page,
blink my eyes and then open them -- and cross my fingers that it
will be right here (pointing to his head)." This may be a
somewhat extreme example, but consider another student who
replied -- "I read it two times if she (the teacher) says study,
once if she says read" -- yet another -- "I read the first line
of every paragraph" (see Brown & Palinscar, in press, a, b).
Some of these "strategies" are going to be more efficient than
others, but note that these students, confident in their method,
are far short of understanding the need for the flexible
application of strategies to meet variations in the task at hand.
Researchers in the areas of metacognition and reading will
tell you that effective reading demands, but young students
rarely produce, a whole variety of self-regulatory activities
such as planning ahead, checking one's understanding, evaluating
the cost-effectiveness of any strategy, and correcting
comprehension or retention failures by a variety of fix-up
strategies. All of this flurry of furious activity is a
reflection of intentional cognition, with the student taking
charge of her own learning processes, and critically evaluating
her own thinking. The rhetoric is undoubtedly familiar and part
of metacognitive lore; nevertheless, the notion of comprehension-
monitoring needs to be examined more closely.
What do we mean when we tell students to monitor their own
learning processes? Comprehension admits of degrees: it is
surely more difficult to check that one understands fully the
logical entailments of a complex theory than it is to check that
we understand the main point of a well-formed narrative. How do
students set acceptable comprehension criteria and know when they
have been met? The same is true of memory monitoring-what are
we teaching when we teach students to monitor their own memory?
We are more likely to be successful if we require students to
check that their retention of material exceeds some criteria of
verbatim recall; it is much more difficult to show students how
to set abstract criteria for gist retention. But effective
studying is more likely to require the application of such
abstract criteria, unless we are satisfied with the rote
retention rather than the critical evaluation of context.
Whitehead, in his address to the British Mathematical Society in
1916, railed against an educational system that resulted in the
rote acquisition of inert knowledge (i.e., facts and procedures
that were acquired but rarely applied because the goal of
learning was retention for its own sake), and argued in favor of
procedures that would promote critical thinking, evaluation and
reflection.
What we mean when we talk about effective studying, then, is
critical thinking about the material, rather than rote retention
or the ability to regurgitate someone else's gist. Here the
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parallels with the needs of science education are clear: We want
students to engage in the equivalent of Socratic dialogues with
themselves, questioning and elaborating their own understanding
of the contents of the text, testing possible generalizations by
raising counterexamples, extracting and applying principles,
detecting tautologies and internal inconsistencies, and so on.
Scholarly journals are replete with examples of how young
students experience what seem like extraordinary difficulty with
such precise, effort-demanding, knowledge-extending and
knowledge-refining activities; however, little is understood of
the source of these difficulties.
Everyday Thinking: The Intuitive Scientist
Why do students look like such ineffectual thinkers? Why do
even the well-intentioned appear to be such sloppy learners or
lazy processers, unwilling or unable to evaluate texts for
internal consistency, compatibility with known facts, or just
plain common sense? Some of these pervasive biases may be due to
the fact that the learners are young, or just plain human? We
would like to argue that these pervasive tendencies are
characteristic of everyday thinking in general rather than
problems of the young in particular.
Human beings are extremely facile at certain forms of
reasoning which suffice for their daily concourse with the world
around them. When we characterize the child as a little
scientist creating and testing hypotheses about his world, we are
Everyday and Academic Thinking
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really making a comparison with the intuitive scientist of
everyday thinking rather than the formal scientist's method of
logical deductive reasoning that human beings are capable of--if
circumstances force them to be! (Johnson-Laird, 1983; Nisbitt &
Ross, 1980; Ross, 1977, 1981; Schweder, 1977, 1980). Much of
human thinking has been called scripted, overlearned, even
mindless (Chanowitz & Langer, 1980), reflecting the fact that it
can run off without a great deal of cognitive effort. Everyday
learning is more often than not a by-product of efficient
incidental cognition rather than the just rewards of intentional
cognition; and it is very efficient for organizing everyday life.
Certain charateristics of the intuitive scientist's
thinking, however, will cause difficulty when the learner must
operate within the realm of formal science education. The very
efficiency of everyday thinking comes at a cost because human
thinking is characterized by certain biases of reasoning that
lead to trouble in formal domains of learning.
Let us consider some of the characteristics of everyday
thinking that have been described in classic "cognitive" works
such as Bartlett's (1958) book on thinking, Tversky and
Kahneman's work on subjective probability and judgment under
uncertainty (see Kahneman & Tversky, 1971, 1973; Tversky &
Kahneman, 1973, 1974), and social cognitive considerations
of "intuitive social scientists" (Nisbitt & Ross, 1980; Ross,
1977, 1981; Schweder, 1977, 1980). In everyday thinking
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intuitive concepts predominate. Intuitive concepts are acquired
without explicit instruction and regardless of the desire to
learn. In contrast, nonintuitive concepts are relatively
difficult to learn, often involve special learning environments
for their acquisition and massive instructional input; they
require an orderly and explicit organization of learning
experiences (Schweder, 1977, 1980). The claim is also made that
the products of such formal learning experiences are generally
absent from the thinking of normal adults, and of all adults most
of the time.
Many have claimed (Nisbitt & Ross, 1980; Schweder, 1977;
Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1973) that basic statistical concepts
having to do with chance and probability are nonintuitive (e.g.,
correlation and contingency). Adults, including social
scientists, typically avoid correlational reasoning. They have
erroneous intuitions about the laws of chance, and tend to regard
a small sample, randomly drawn from the population, as highly
representative. Tversky and Kahneman (1971), for example,
found that research psychologists were more impressed by a single
experimental outcome which provided strong support for a
hypothesis than by the conjuction of the same result with
another, which provided positive but weaker support for the
hypothesis. Further, reasoning is unduly weighted by such
factors as personally experienced frequency of occurrence, ease.
of retrievability and imaginability of examples (i.e., the ease
with which relevant instances come to mind). Unwarranted
generalizations are made from specific personal cases, due
importance is rarely given to base rate or consensus information
(see Tversky & Kahneman, 1971, 1973).
Argument and decision making in everyday thinking also
differ from "scientific thought." Four hundred years ago,
Francis Bacon deplored the human tendency to maintain
preconceptions in the face of seemingly overwhelming logical or
empirical challenges to their validity. And from Bartlett on, we
have seen many examples of such resistance to the weight of
evidence. Everyday thinking is biased in favor of positive
exemplars, negative evidence is given less weight and often not
invoked at all. Everyday arguments are slanted towards definite
decisions, even if the evidence is inconclusive or does not
warrant them. Most conversational arguments are inductive, not
deductive, and the inductions of everyday conversations are
rarely explicit; the inferences are not entailed by the premises.
Empirical evidence is preferred even when premises can be
evaluated in terms of their nonempirical truth values (internal
contradictions and tautologies) (Osherson & Markman, 1975).
The model of the everyday human is one of an intuitive
scientist, whose high level of overall proficiency is marred by
specific inferential shortcomings. For everyday life, these
shortcomings are rarely fatal. But for academic life, and
particularly for the development of formal scientistic thought,
Everyday and Academic Thinking
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they are costly indeed. As Tversky and Kahneman (1971) argue,
these intuitive concepts are sometimes shared by trained
scientists as well as naive everyday thinkers, and this has
unfortunate consequences for scientific enquiry. Indeed, there
has been a spate of studies showing that intuitive scientific
knowledge is strongly held and often gets in the way of the
acquisition of scientific theory (diSessa, 1983; McCloskey,
1983; White, 1983).
diSessa's (1983), for example, showed that relatively
sophisticated M.I.T. undergraduate physics students are often
"welded" to their naive theories. He demonstrated that when
instructors give explicit problem solving prompts, or offer an
alternative explanation, students often distort evidence or
present counterexamples designed to support their own position
and/or sabotage that of the instructor. McCloskey (1983)
believes that on the basis of everyday experiences, most people
development remarkably well-articulated naive theories of
physics--theories that are inconsistent with the fundamental
principles of classical Newtonian physics. In his work,
McCloskey (1983) has shown that college students' often make
judgement errors about the motion of solid objects because they
subscribe to a particular naive theory of motion (the impetus
theory). Moreover, McCloskey, like diSessa, believes that naive
theories are strongly held and may not easily be changed by
instruction, unless instructors make explicit comparisons between
naive beliefs and classical theory.
Steps to Overcoming the Problem
All this may sound depressing, but it does not have to be
interpreted this way. A first step to overcoming a problem is
recognizing that it exists and identifying its nature. The more
we know about how students prefer to think, the more we know
about their biases as well as their strengths, the more likely it
is that we will be able to design effective instruction tailored
to their needs; that is, instruction designed to overcome their
thinking "bugs" (J. Brown & VanLehn, 1982). The ability to
characterize students' misconceptions and procedural biases, and
to map the steps between entering competence and desired
competence, are necessary first steps before we can design
effective instruction to bridge the gap.
Over the last four years several successful instructional
studies, guided by these considerations, have been conducted in
our labatory. (Brown & Day, 1983; Brown & Palincsar, in press-a,
b; Day, 1980; Palinscar & Brown, 1984). These instructional
progams have worked in the sense that a detailed analysis of the
task components was conducted, the students' entering biases were
diagnosed and the mismatch between these and the strategies
required for competence were identified, and the instructional
procedure leading to efficient performance was successfully
implemented. We will give as an example some recent work on
13
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teaching students to comprehend beginning scientific text,
because clear generalizations can be made from these studies to
science and math education (at least in the early grades). We
will describe briefly the highlights of the program and then end
with some speculations about extensions to science education.
The students were generally disadvantaged seventh graders
with average decoding skills, with generally weak academic
records, who experienced particular difficulty on both
standardized and criterion-referenced reading comprehension
tests. They tended to score about 20% correct on these types of
tests in the classroom and in the laboratory before the
intervention began. It appeared that the student's low level of
performance was due to their extreme passivity in such
situations, their favorite strategy being the one-shot read --
or, if under pressure, the desperate re-read. Whereas the
desired behavior on such tests is the deployment of active
comprehension-fostering and -monitoring strategies.
The instructional procedure developed by Brown and
Palincsar, called reciprocal teaching, was designed to mimic the
main features of expert tutoring, or expert scaffolding, to use
Bruner's (1978) term. Expert scaffolding is a natural teaching
style whereby an expert (a teacher, a peer, a parent, a
mastercraftsman) provides a supporting context in which students
acquire skills (Brown & Reeve, in press). The expert initially.
takes on the major responsibility for the group's activity. The
Everyday and Academic Thinking
15
expert performs, models, and explains, relinquishing part of the
task to the novices only at the level each one is capable of
negotiating at any one point in time. As a novice becomes more
competent, the expert increases her demands, requiring
participation at a slightly more challenging level.
In Palincsar and Brown's (1984) procedure the teacher and
student took turns leading a dialogue on sections of the text
they were reading. The teacher assigned a segment of the passage
to be read and either indicated that it was her turn to be the
teacher or assigned a student to teach that segment. The adult
and the students then read the assigned segment silently. After
reading, the teacher (student or adult) for that segment
summarized the content, asked a question that a teacher or test
might ask on that segment, discussed and clarified any
difficulties, and finally made a prediction about future content.
All of these activities were embedded in as natural a dialogue as
possible, with the teacher and students giving feedback to each
other.
Palincsar and Brown (1984) instructed students in the use of
four strategies used by expert readers: Summarizing, questioning,
clarifying, and predicting. These four activities were selected
because they can be both comprehension-fostering and
comprehension-monitoring activities if used properly. Recalling
the gist of what has been read is a good way of testing whether.
important material has been identified; if an adequate synopsis
Everyday and Academic Thinking
16
cannot be produced, it is a sign that remedial action is called
for. Thus, summarizing what one has read, and asking questions
of clarification, interpretation, and prediction are activities
that both improve comprehension and allow students to monitor
their own understanding.
Reciprocal teaching involves more than just taking turns: it
involves what has been called proleptic teaching. Proleptic
means "in anticipation of competence," and in the context of
instruction refers to situations where a novice is encouraged to
participate in a group activity before she is able to perform
unaided; the social context supports the individual's efforts
(Brown & Reeve, in press; Reeve & Brown, 1985). In these
teaching situations, a novice carries out simple aspects of the
task while observing and learning from an expert, who serves as a
model for higher level involvement. At first the novice
participates more or less as a spectator responsible for very
little of the actual work. But as she becomes more experienced
and capable of performing at a higher level, the expert guides
her to increasingly more competent performance. The teacher and
student come to share the cognitive work load equally. Finally,
the adult fades herself out, as it were, leaving the student to
take over, and the adult teacher to assume the role of a
sympathetic coach.
Within these systems of tutelage, the child learns about the
task at his own rate; in the presence of experts, participating
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only at a level he is capable of fulfilling--or a little beyond-
thereby presenting a comfortable challenge. The child is taken
gradually to the limits of his ability, and the mental jumps
expected of him on his way to competence are never large. The
expert, then, (a) models appropriate comprehension activities,
(b) makes the usually covert strategies, overt, (c) engages in an
"on-line" diagnosis of difficulties and monitors understanding,
and (d) gives appropriate feedback, and asks a little more of the
child as the child acquires competence. The novice, in contrast,
(a) participates at his or her own current cognitive level, (b)
makes overt current competence, (c) receives feedback that
rewards and stretches, and (d) gradually progresses to competence
(see Brown & Palincsar, in press-a, b; Palincsar & Brown, 1984,
for example of students progress).
The results of using reciprocal teaching procedures with
grade school and junior high school students has been
encouraging. Ten main outcomes have been found: (1) there was
clear evidence of improvement in the students' ability to
paraphrase, question, clarify and predict when called upon to do
so; (2) the students progressed from passive observers to active
teachers, able to lead the dialogue independently, and in some
case, eventually take the role of the peer tutor; (3) there was a
large and reliable quantitative improvement on the comprehension
tests (from 20 to 80% correct), bringing these poor readers up to
the level set by good comprehenders; (4) the effect was durable;
Everyday and Academic Thinking
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there was no drop in the level of performance for up to an eight
week period, and little after six months; (5) the effect
generalized to the classroom setting, with students reaching or
surpassing the average level for their age mates; (6) training
resulted in reliable transfer to laboratory tasks that differed
in surface features from the training and assessment tasks;
writing summaries, predicting appropriate comprehension
questions, and detecting text incongruities all improved; (7)
sizeable improvements in standardized comprehension scores were
recorded, averaging two years; (8) the full reciprocal teaching
procedure always resulted in greater improvement and more durable
performance than competing instructional procedures, such as
direct instruction in the use of the strategies; (9) the
intervention was instructionally feasible; that is, it was no
less successful in natural group settings conducted by regular
teachers than it was when conducted by the experimenter in a
laboratory; and (10) the teachers were uniformly enthusiastic
about the procedure once they had mastered it and many planned to
incorporate it into their routine teaching repertoires.
Extensions to Math Education
There is no reason, in principle, why reciprocal teaching
procedures cannot be used in other domains. We have already used
the techniques to improve listening comprehension in first
grade children (Palincsar & Brown, in press); and, Berieter and.
Scardamalia's work suggests that the reciprocal teaching
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procedure can be used to foster writing skills (Berieter &
Scardamalia, 1985; Scardamalia, Bereiter, & Steinbach, 1984).
Can the techniques be be used outside of the language arts
to facilitate problem solving in science and math? In principle,
what is needed is a task analysis to identify what a particular
form of problem demands in terms of knowledge and processing
strategies, what strategies the child possesses that may be
helpful or misleading, and then a script for making the desired
procedures simple, concrete, explicit and readily modeled by the
teacher. This may appear a difficult problem, but it is unlikely
to be insoluble considering the enormous amount of work that is
now appearing analyzing the systematic error patterns typical of
early learning in mathematics and science (Brown & Campione, in
press).
Recent research aimed at uncovering the principles involved
in arithmetic learning suggest methods of intervention that go
beyond blind drill and practice. Progress has been made, for
example, in mapping the development of number concepts (Gelman &
Gallistel, 1978; Gelman & Meck, in press), arithmetic facts
(Ashcraft, 1982; Baroody, 1983; Siegler & Schrager, 1984),
principles underlying place value notion (Resnick, 1982, 1984),
and the systematic errors, or "bugs", children make in completing
written subtraction problems (J. Brown & VanLehn, 1982). These
developments have made possible sensitive diagnosis of the
child's understanding, or misconceptions, of arithmetic facts and
Everyday and Academic Thinking Everyday and Academic Thinking
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procedures (Allardice & Ginsburg, 1983). We consider that
procedures, modelled on those designed to foster reading and
listening comprehension, could be developed to help young
children understand their procedural arithmetic bugs. Even with
very young children understanding can be the aim of instruction.
What kind of remedial instruction should be instigated, once
the "pattern of errors" in a child's thinking have been
identified? We cannot provide an empirical answer to this
question yet, but consistent with the views specified earlier, we
believe that instruction should help children reflect on the
purpose and meaning of arithmetic procedures. A concrete
instantiation of this suggestion exists in Open Court's Real Math
Thinking Stories (Willoughby, Bereiter, Hilton, & Rubinstein,
1981: see Table 1). The stories pose problems that tap the
child's understanding of not only mathematical principles but
also a whole variety of everyday thinking biases that impede
deductive thinking. At intervals through the story, as a story
character makes a thinking error, the teacher is encouraged to
stop and engage the children in an argument on why a situation
might lead to difficulties. With careful consideration of the
sequencing of problems and the design of scripts to help the
teachers lead the dialogues initially, the exact equivalent of
the reciprocal teaching procedures could be used to foster
mathematical thinking skills.
-~---"----"-------------
Insert Table 1 about hereI----~------------------
Summary and Conclusions
Much of what has been called reading comprehension research
has actually been research in reasoning, with wide applicability
to many forms of academic learning situations, including math and
science. Science education may involve a particularly extensive
version of the general problem of a mismatch between the
customary modes of thinking of human beings, but it perhaps is
not different in kind. All academic learning involves this
mismatch to some extent. In settings of formal education, the
goals and contexts of learning are usually not of the child's
choosing. The goal is rarely spontaneous discovery dictated by
interest, but learning for learning's sake, remembering as a goal
in itself rather than as a means to a meaningful end. Much of
academic learning is divorced from readily understandable goals,
e.g., the play goals of childhood or the work activities of
adulthood (Bruner, 1972). The learner is asked to acquire
decontextualized bodies of knowledge for knowledge's sake, in the
service of no goal other than success in school. Such practices
even when undertaken by the gifted or selected student tend to
result in the accumulation of Whitehead's "inert knowledge,"--
remembered but not understood facts that are rarely applied
appropriately. Even the preferred categories or structuring of
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knowledge in temporal, spatial scripts or thematic episodes must
be replaced by academic forms of organization by hierarchy and
taxonomy (Mandler, 1983). School learners are required not only
to acquire knowledge in specific domains, such as mathematics and
science, they are also required to "learn how to learn" in
general, to become something akin to all-purpose learning
machines, developing routines for studying in general. Under
such circumstances, children's natural learning proclivities are
often overwhelmed by the demands of acquiring large amounts of
decontextualized material, organized in non-preferred modes,
under greater demands for precision and processing capacity than
is generally the case in everyday learning and thinking.
Recognition of these facts, together with and detailed mappings
of the mismatch, has the potential for guiding the design of
instruction in new and exciting ways.
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Table 1
An Excerpt From an Open Court Thinking Story
"How many piglets are there?" asked Portia.
"Count them yourselves," said Grandfather with a smile,
"if you can."
"Of course I can count," said Ferdie. "That's easy."
Ferdie crouched down beside the pen and counted the
piglets as they ran past. He counted, "1, 2, 3, 5 . .
"You made a mistake," said Portia.
What mistake did Ferdie make?
What should he have said?
"You skipped 4," said Portia.
"All right, said Ferdie, "I'll start again."
This time he didn't skip any numbers. Every time a
piglet ran past, he counted. He counted, "1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6,
7, 8, 9, 10." Then he shouted, "Ten piglets! That's a lot!"
"Hm," said Grandfather, "I didn't think there were
that many."
Could Ferdie have made a mistake? How?
"I think you counted some piglets more than once," said
Portia. "You counted every time a piglet ran past, and some-
times they came past more than once. Let me try."
Portia looked into the pen, where the piglets were still
running around. She said, "There's a pink one. That's 1.
There's a black one. That's 2. There's a spotted one.
That's 3. And, oh, there's one with a funny tail. That's 4.
Martha has 4 piglets."
"You did that wrong," said Ferdie. "You didn't count
all the piglets."
How could Portia have made a mistake?
"You counted only 1 pink one," said Ferdie, "and
there's more than 1 pink one. See? And there's more than
1 black one, too. I don't know how many piglets there are.
I wish they'd stand still so we could count them."
"Just wait," said Grandfather. "Maybe they will."
In a little while Martha finished eating and lay
down on her side. The piglets stopped running around.
They went over to their mother and started feeding.
"Now we can count them," said Portia. "They're all
in a row." She counted, "1, 2, 3, 4, 5."
How many piglets did she count? (5)


